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## Operational Support for Future Unconventional Warfare

From an operations perspective, there are serious impediments to establishing underground networks in peacetime for contingency usage in time of war. While not necessarily overwhelming, these problems do suggest caution in making preparations for irregular warfare contingent on progress in this area. Specifically:

- -- Operations personnel are charged with establishing professional, high level unilateral penetrations in denied areas. This task consumes currently available resources.
- -- The recruitment of clandestine underground "networks" is inherently insecure and highly susceptible to host country penetration particulary in sophisticated counterintelligence environments such as Eastern Europe.
- -- While the risk to life of indigenous collaborators is worth it in wartime, this point is more debatable in peacetime unless the operation is of demonstrable high value.
- -- Inherently insecure operations tend to heighten concerns of the host governments about our operations, with resultant impact on the security of other agents.
- -- Political backing in the USG for such activity, some of which will be compromised, comes and goes. Operators have found that willingness to sustain a political repercussion to compromised activity by one policy group is rapidly disavowed by succeeding policymakers actually faced with the event. Among other things, careers suffer.
- -- Recruitment of this type of agent network sends an extremely militant message to the target government, and we must be certain that war preparation is that desired message.
- -- From the basic operator's point of view, the career pay off is not high. There is little intelligence flow of value.

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The above negative considerations can, of course, be overcome by high level sustained policy decisions. Short of that, however, the following is immediately possible:

- -- Tasking of current unilateral agents for identification of nodes of opposition and related data.
- -- Relevant operational personality target studies short of actual recruitment. Some recruitment activity with these operations in mind.
- -- Related propaganda operations designed to intensify opposition thinking in the target country.